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ABSTRACT
The increased use of algorithmic predictions in sensitive do-
mains has been accompanied by both enthusiasm and concern.
To understand the opportunities and risks of these technologies,
it is key to study how experts alter their decisions when using
such tools. In this paper, we study the adoption of an algorith-
mic tool used to assist child maltreatment hotline screening
decisions. We focus on the question: Are humans capable of
identifying cases in which the machine is wrong, and of over-
riding those recommendations? We first show that humans do
alter their behavior when the tool is deployed. Then, we show
that humans are less likely to adhere to the machine’s recom-
mendation when the score displayed is an incorrect estimate
of risk, even when overriding the recommendation requires
supervisory approval. These results highlight the risks of full
automation and the importance of designing decision pipelines
that provide humans with autonomy.
Author Keywords
Human-in-the-loop; Decision support; Algorithm aversion;
Automation bias; Algorithm assisted decision making; Child
welfare
CCS Concepts
•Human-centered computing → Human computer inter-
action (HCI); User studies; •Information systems→ Deci-
sion support systems; •Applied computing→ Computing
in government;
INTRODUCTION
Risk assessment tools are increasingly being incorporated into
expert decision-making pipelines across domains such as crim-
inal justice, education, health, and public services [8, 26, 23, 7,
45]. These tools, which range from simple regression models
to more complex machine learning models, distill available
information on a given case into a risk score reflecting the
likelihood of one or more adverse outcomes. Bolstered by
decades of research showing that statistical models outperform
human experts on prediction tasks, there is widespread opti-
mism that these tools will increase the quality of decisions [32,
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11, 20, 1, 25]. This optimism is tempered by evidence that,
while humans provided with machine predictions may achieve
improved performance, not only do they continue to underper-
form the machine predictions, but they may also uptake the
information in ways that leads to increased disparities in deci-
sion outcomes across racial [19] and socioeconomic groups
[42]. Such findings raise critical questions about the role of
humans in the loop and human-machine complementarity in
key societal domains. In this work we focus on one important
question in this area: Are humans capable of identifying cer-
tain cases where the machine’s recommendation is wrong, and
appropriately overriding the recommendation in such cases?
We analyze a real world child welfare decision making context
where call workers are tasked with deciding whether a call
concerning potential child neglect or maltreatment should be
screened in for investigation. While in many instances the
information communicated in the call may be enough for
the call worker to make a determination, in other instances
the information may be vague and inconclusive. In an effort
to better focus resources on investigating cases where the
children are at greatest risk, Allegheny County has deployed a
risk assessment tool called the Allegheny Family Screening
Tool (AFST) to assist call workers in their screening decisions.
The tool uses multi-system administrative data to assess the
likelihood that children on the case will experience adverse
child welfare events in the near future. More information about
the tool and its development can be found on the County’s
AFST website [38].
Some time after the tool was deployed it was discovered that
a technical glitch had resulted in a subset of model inputs
being incorrectly calculated in realtime. This in turn resulted
in misestimated risk scores being shown in some cases. While,
as we elaborate on below, the misestimation was often mild,
and the shown score generally provided reasonable risk infor-
mation, the glitch permits us a rare opportunity to investigate
real world decision making in the presence of misestimated
risk.
Before proceeding, we pause to make an important point.
These types of technical issues are not uncommon. What is
uncommon is for organizations to choose to be transparent
about their occurrence. We recognize Allegheny County for
their transparency and hope that this approach will become the
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norm in the deployment of algorithmic systems in sensitive
societal domains.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We be-
gin with a discussion of related work in which we provide
an overview of phenomena such as algorithm aversion and
automation bias that come to bear on human decision mak-
ing in the presence of algorithmic decision support tools. We
then describe the child welfare decision making context, the
risk assessment tool deployment setup, and our available data.
Our analysis of the data begins by demonstrating that there
was a marked change in workers’ screening decisions in the
post-deployment period. Having established that an overall
change in behavior did occur, we then investigate the extent
to which call workers deviate from recommendations based
on a misestimated risk score. We show that workers are able
to appropriately override the tool in many such cases. We
also probe questions of potential disparities in adherence to
recommendations across racial and socio-economic groups,
finding that the deployment of the tool neither significantly
mitigates nor exacerbates disparities observed at the given
level of analysis. Lastly, we conclude with a discussion of hu-
man and system factors that we believe may have contributed
to the observed results, and outline opportunities for further
research to better understand relevant factors.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Prior research has attempted to answer whether and how the
deployment of algorithmic risk assessment tools affects users’
decisions. While many have advocated for the adoption of
these tools on the basis of their superior predictive accuracy,
findings are mixed on whether integrating prediction tools
into decision making significantly improves decision quality.
Indeed, research in the field suggests that the outcomes of
decisions taken by a human aided by a decision support system
are often no better than those taken by the human alone.
Recent work has paid special attention to the introduction of
risk assessment in the context of pretrial decision making in
the criminal justice system. Although the integration of the
risk assessment tools was, ex ante, expected to lead to a sharp
and persistent decrease in incarceration rates, recent findings
suggest that there is no impact at all [15] or find there is a de-
crease but of much smaller magnitude than initially hoped [44].
There is consensus that these lackluster results are due at least
in large part to the wide heterogeneity in judges’ compliance
with the tools’ recommendations [9]. Notably, differential
compliance has been shown to be a factor driving increased
poor-rich [42] and black-white [46, 2] disparities in the post-
deployment period. For instance, [2] found that the increased
racial gap in incarceration rates post-deployment was due both
to inter-variation—judges in whiter counties showing higher
compliance—and by intra-variations—overrides of low and
moderate risk being more frequent for black than for white
defendants.
More broadly, there are two competing tendencies that have
been observed in studies of human compliance with algorith-
mic recommendations: algorithm aversion and automation
bias. Algorithm aversion–the tendency to ignore tool recom-
mendations after seeing that they can be erroneous–originates
from a lack of agency [29, 12] and lack of transparency of the
algorithm [49]. Studies have shown that users will knowingly
sacrifice accuracy in favor of gaining some control over the al-
gorithm’s output [14]. Similarly, [18] reports an experiment in
which humans override the machine’s predictions when these
are highly reliable. Users’ reliance on the system is known to
vary with the observed [51, 52] and stated accuracy [50] of
the system. However, even if the recommendations of more
accurate systems are followed more often, agents affected by
algorithm aversion may nevertheless prefer human judgment
over algorithmic predictions even when evidence known to
both the designer and the user clearly indicates that the algo-
rithmic predictions are more accurate than human assessment
[13].
Users affected by automation bias, on the other hand, will fol-
low tool recommendations despite available (but unnoticed or
unconsidered) information that would indicate that the recom-
mendation is wrong. Automation bias consists of two classes
of errors. Omission errors refer to instances where humans
fails to detect problematic cases (or fail to act) because they
were not flagged as such by the system. A prominent example
is that of pilots in high-tech cockpits, who are prone to rely-
ing blindly on automated cues as a heuristic replacement for
vigilant information seeking [35]. Commission errors refer
to instances where humans take action on the basis of an er-
roneous algorithmic recommendation, failing to incorporate
contradictory external information into the decision process.
In the clinical decision support context, commission errors
may result in patients being subjected to unnecessary, poten-
tially invasive testing or treatment.
Studies analyzing factors contributing to automation bias have
found that complex tasks and time pressure may increase over-
reliance on decision support [41, 17]. The users’ experience
level and their confidence in their own decisions have also
been found to be causes of automation bias [31, 33]. Social
accountability has been found to reduce automation bias [43],
an important result when considering decision support systems
used by experts with high public visibility or who are publicly
elected, such as judges. Meanwhile, studies focused on the
causes of algorithm aversion have found that repeatedly see-
ing the algorithm make the same mistake leads to decreased
reliance of the agent on the system [13], while giving some
control over the algorithm can counter this phenomenon [14].
Automation bias and algorithm aversion are opposing phe-
nomena. While automation bias degrades decision quality
by driving over-compliance with algorithmic recommenda-
tions, algorithm aversion does so by driving under-compliance.
There are two characteristics of the decision context that are
indicative of which form of bias is likely to dominate: the type
of task, and the level of automation. A significant portion of
the literature analyzing automation bias has studied high-tech
cockpits [34, 43, 10, 41], while others have looked at health-
care diagnosis [31], and automated control systems for fault
management in a thermal-hydraulic environment [33]. All
these are diagnostic tasks, where it can be assumed that there
is a “ground truth" that is in principle knowable to humans.
Algorithm aversion has been mostly discussed in tasks of a
different nature: prognostic tasks, where predictions pertain
what will happen in the future. These tasks are often behav-
ioral prediction tasks, which concern people’s future actions
or performance. Examples include predicting students’ per-
formance on an MBA program using admissions data [13],
forecasting sales [29, 18], and predicting which defendants
will be rearrested or will fail to appear for court if released [12,
15, 44]. In these tasks there is an irreducible degree of uncer-
tainty, and any predictive model, whether human or machine,
is bound to make mistakes. The role of the level of automation
on over-reliance in decision support systems has been further
discussed in [10].
Motivated by these challenges, recent work has explored ap-
proaches to characterizing human-machine complementarity
in risk assessment contexts and devising approaches to com-
bine the strengths of both. [47] study differences in factors
relied upon by human (crowdworker) recidivism predictions
and those of COMPAS, a commercial risk assessment tool.
The authors identify systematic differences in human and ma-
chine predictions, but find that those differences could not be
leveraged to improve predictions. [21] suggest that, instead of
generating predictions, the algorithm should be trained with a
humans-in-the-loop to incorporate the human decision process,
and should only report to the human simpler and useful rep-
resentations of the features. [30] propose a learning to defer
model, where the algorithm chooses to make a prediction or
defer to the human taking into account both the model’s and
the human’s accuracy. Lastly, focusing on a medical diagnosis
task, [40] propose a method for triaging cases between full au-
tomation and focused human effort in a manner that improves
diagnostic accuracy above the human and machine predictions
alone.
Recent work has also studied the effect of providing expla-
nations on adherence to algorithmic recommendations. [24]
and [37] show that the perceived accuracy of the system de-
pends on the degree to which explanations are easily under-
standable, with very complicated explanations reducing per-
ceived accuracy. At the same time, explanations can also
mislead users, as shown by [27]. In the context of Face-
book’s News Feed algorithm, [39] found that while explana-
tions helped users understand how the system works, they did
not help them in evaluating the correctness of the output. In
the context of Reddit post removal, [22] found that providing
explanations helped users better adhere to community guide-
lines. Explanations may also affect perceptions of justice of
algorithmic decisions, as studied by [4]. Such perceptions may
not only relate to the output but also to the predictors used by
the system [48].
In many of these studies adherence is taken to be synonymous
with trust. Indeed, while there is no single commonly adopted
definition of trust in the HCI literature, the term trust typically
refers to a measure of, or the factor influencing, the degree
to which the human is willing to delegate decision-making
to the machine in absence of complete knowledge of the al-
gorithmic pipeline [28, 51, 3, 37, 50]. We note that in our
setting—and in any setting where the objective optimized for
by the algorithmic system does not fully capture all relevant
costs and payoffs of the decision—trust and adherence are
not one and the same. In the child welfare context, the risk
assessed by the tool is just one factor relevant to determining
whether an investigation is appropriate. Other factors such as
resources, recent investigations, information conveyed during
the allegation call, are all also relevant. Workers are not ex-
pected to adhere to the scores in all cases, and may trust the
ability of the tool to assess certain dimensions of risk even if
in a given instance that risk is not the most relevant decision
factor. Both [8] and [5] provide more indepth discussion
of algorithmic tools and their use in the child welfare system.
Most notably, [5] take a deep dive into factors that influence
affected communities perceptions comfort and trust in the use
algorithmic decision support in the child welfare context. The
authors find that general distrust in the child welfare system,
as well as specifics of how and whether risk information is
communicated to case workers and families are important to
perceptions of procedural and interpersonal justice.
Our work contributes to the nascent literature on human-
machine complementarity in risk assessment by investigat-
ing whether humans are able to correct for misestimated risk
scores in a real world decision making context. Our study
relies on a retrospective analysis of observed call worker de-
cisions before and after a risk assessment tool was integrated
into the decision making pipeline. A similar context but in a
different setting is analysed by [6], which study the effects of
inconsistencies in sentencing recommendations due to human
errors in the judicial setting in Maryland. The authors find
that judges are more likely to go along with mistakenly lesser
sentences for violent offenses, but tend to discount recommen-
dations that are mistakenly too high.
DEPLOYMENT SETUP AND DATA
Call workers at the child welfare hotline are tasked with de-
ciding whether a call alleging potential child maltreatment or
neglect should be screened in for investigation. In making
their decisions, call workers in Allegheny County have access
to the information communicated in the referral call, along
with multi-system administrative data on demographics, child
welfare involvement, criminal history, and other information
related to the children and adults associated to a referral. The
administrative data consists of hundreds of data elements. It
is therefore challenging for workers to make systematic and
effective use of the administrative data in each case. In or-
der to help workers make better use of this data, Allegheny
County introduced a risk assessment tool that distills the infor-
mation contained therein into a single risk score reflecting the
likelihood that the children on the referral will experience ad-
verse child welfare related outcomes in the months following
the referral. The intended use of the tool is to help workers
identify high-risk cases in instances where the information
communicated in the call may be insufficient, inconclusive, or
otherwise incomplete in reflecting the immediate or long-arc
risk of the children. As we further discuss in Section 3.2, spe-
cific guidelines were created to strongly encourage screen-ins
(investigations) for the highest scoring cases.
Predictive model
Throughout the paper, we refer to the case associated to a
call as a referral, each of which may have several referral
records associated to it, one for each children involved in the
call. The deployed tool was trained with all referral records
collected by Allegheny County between April 2010 and July
2014. Two distinct predictive models estimate the probability
of out-of-home placement and of future referral for each child
based on features that include demographics, past welfare in-
teraction, public welfare, adult and juvenile criminal justice
involvement, and behavioral health information available on
all persons associated with each referral. Out-of-home place-
ment refers to whether the child is placed out of the home
following an investigation, and a future referral refers to a
future call involving the child coming in to the hotline. The
predicted probabilities are then converted into an integer score
in the range from 1 to 20, corresponding to the ventiles. The
score to be shown to the workers is calculated as the maximum
score over both models, over all children involved in a referral.
We denote this aggregated score as S ∈ {1, . . . ,20}. A more
detailed description of the model can be found on the County’s
website [38].
Deployment
By design, call workers are only shown risk scores for cases
with sufficient information. During the analyzed deployment
period, 92.5% of referrals had an associated score shown. In
addition to displaying a risk score, the tool assigns a label of
“mandatory screen-in” to certain referrals, which means that
the supervisor’s approval is required in order to screen out the
referral. These correspond to the cases whose calculated score
for out-of-home placement is greater or equal to 18. That
is, these are cases where at least one child associated to the
referral has a placement score of at least 18. Figure 1 presents
a graphical representation of the decision-making pipeline.
Figure 1: Decision pipeline for child welfare services in Al-
legheny County. Re-referral risk score and out-of-home place-
ment (ooh) risk score are calculated for all children associated
to a referral. The maximum over these scores is shown to the
call worker, who also has access to historical records and infor-
mation conveyed in the call. The call worker decides whether
to screen in the call for investigation. Screening out calls with
an ooh risk score ≥ 18 requires supervisor’s approval.
Score misestimation
During deployment, a glitch in the system led to certain model
inputs not being calculated correctly in realtime. Figure 3a
shows a histogram of the fraction of values for each fea-
ture whose realtime values did not match retrospectively re-
calculated values. There are two reasons for this mismatch.
The first is due to an issue, since resolved, wherein the real-
time database queries were erroneously returning counts and
indicators of 0. Figure 3b compares the fraction of referral
records where the feature was calculated as 0 in real time vs.
retrospectively for the top six most frequently mismatched
binary indicators. The second issue is that as cases evolve the
roles of different adults associated to the case and information
about them may evolve. For instance, the individual identified
as a perpetrator may change between the initial run and the
retrospective analysis. These more naturally occurring mis-
matches are unlikely to have as significant an impact on the
calculated score.
Figure 2: Heatmap of the density of shown score S˜ conditional
on assessed score S. A cell at row r and column c shows the
fraction of the time that a referral assessed at a score of S= c
was shown to have a score of S˜= r.
As a result of the glitch in how model inputs were being cal-
culated in realtime, the score displayed (‘shown’) to workers
during deployment did not always correspond to the score that
should have been shown. Figure 2 shows the distribution of
the scores. The concentration of cases around the diagonal
indicates that the shown scores were most often equal or very
close to the assessed score that should have been displayed.
These circumstances of deployment allow us to study the be-
havior of call workers when the shown score is inaccurate. In
particular, we are able to analyze what happens when differ-
ences between the assessed and the shown score result in a
different “mandatory screen-in” policy being applied.
The terminology and notation we use throughout the paper are
detailed in Table 1.
Data
The risk assessment tool was deployed in August 2016. We use
data from January 2015 to July 2016 to analyze the behavior of
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Analysis of the glitch. (a) shows the normalized histogram of the fraction of referral records affected by the glitch for
each feature. For the six (binary) features with highest fractions, (b) shows their distribution with and without the glitch.
Table 1: Terminology and notation used throughout the paper.
Term Notation Description
Assessed score S ∈ {1, . . . ,20} Score assessed by the predictive model. Maximum over assessed risk of
out-of-home placement and assessed risk of re-referral.
Shown score S˜ ∈ {1, . . . ,20} Score shown to the call worker. It should correspond to the assessed score,
but is subject to a glitch in the system.
Assessed mandatory screen-
in
M ∈ {0,1} M = 1 if assessed risk of out-of-home placement greater or equal to 18.
Supervisor’s approval required for screen out.
Shown mandatory screen-in M˜ ∈ {0,1} Mandatory screen-in label shown to the call worker. It should correspond to
assessed mandatory screen-in, but is subject to a glitch in the system.
call workers before the deployment of the tool, and data from
August 2016 until December 2017 to study their behavior after
adoption.
We constrain our analysis to the 92.5% of referrals that had
an associated score shown. Moreover, existing regulation dic-
tates that certain calls must be investigated. Referrals that fall
under this category include those in which the call concerns
bodily injury and sexual abuse. Since the call worker had
no discretion on deciding whether or not to screen in these
calls, we exclude from our analysis the 19% of referrals that
fall under this legislation. Finally, we also exclude the refer-
rals that are associated to open investigations, since the call
worker does not make any determination in these cases. This
excludes 19% of the remaining observations. Once we have
constrained the data to those cases that had a score shown and
for which the call worker made a determination, we are left
with 27,575 referral records, corresponding to 11,802 refer-
rals (recall that multiple children may be associated to a call,
leading to multiple referral records within each referral).
ANALYSIS
Change in call workers’ behavior
The main question we seek to answer in this section is whether
call workers updated their screening behavior after the tool
was deployed. In other words, did algorithm aversion lead to
the tool being ignored altogether?
We first analyze the behavior of call workers with respect to
the assessed score, S, before and after the deployment of the
tool. While ideally we would also display similar results for
the shown score, S˜, the glitch that produced S˜ is not retrospec-
tively reproducible. We are unable to calculate what S˜ would
have been in the pre-deployment period. However, since pre-
and post-deployment decisions would remain the same with
respect to both S and S˜ if workers did not alter their decisions,
it is nevertheless insightful to study variation with S.
As we now discuss, the results indicate that workers did update
their behavior. First, we note that the overall screen-in rate
did not vary before and after deployment, remaining around
45%. This stability over time is likely explained by the fact
that the agency investigates as many cases as their resources
allow. However, we do observe a change on which cases were
Figure 4: Screen-in rates by assessed score S before and after
deployment. After deployment screen-in decisions are better
aligned with the score.
investigated. Figure 4 shows the screen-in rates across values
of the assessed risk score S. The steeper slope of the post-
deployment curve, particularly for very high and very low
risk cases, indicates that post-deployment screen-ins are better
aligned with the score. We see a pronounced increase in the
screen-in rate of highest risk cases, and a pronounced decrease
in the screen in rates for low and moderate risk cases.
Recall that any referral where the placement score was 18 or
greater was flagged as a “mandatory screen-in”. Shown manda-
tories required supervisory approval to be screened out. While
not all assessed mandatories (M = 1) where shown mandato-
ries (M˜ = 1) and vice versa, it is nevertheless instructive to
look at how screen-in rates varied pre- and post- deployment
with respect to M. Figure 5 shows a timeline of screen-in rate
of cases corresponding to M= 1. A sharp increase in screen-in
rates for assessed mandatory cases can be seen the month of
deployment. Overall, in the period before deployment, cases
that would have fallen in the category M = 1 had a screen-in
rate of 58%, while after deployment this rate increased to 71%.
As there appears to be no change in the jurisdiction’s policies
or types of calls received around the time of deployment, we
attribute the sudden increase in screen-in rate to the deploy-
ment of the model. This increase is to be expected given that
there is a barrier to overriding cases M˜ = 1, which is strongly
correlated with M. Notably, the increase is smaller than what
would be expected if automation bias were to occur. Even
though there is a cost-barrier to override the machine (required
supervisory approval), only 66% of cases shown as mandatory
screen-in, M˜ = 1, are screened in.
Figure 5: Timeline of screen-in rates for cases with mandatory
screen-in policy, M= 1. Dotted line marks date of deployment.
We find a sharp and persistent increase in screen in rates for
assessed mandatory cases. Some of this increase is attributable
to assessed mandatories that were also correctly shown as
mandatory screen-ins.
Figure 6: Alignment of screen-in rates with respect to assessed
score S and shown score S˜. We find that post-deployment
decisions are better aligned with the assessed score than the
score that was shown, indicating that workers were successful
in correcting for the score miscalculation in certain cases.
Overrides of erroneous scores
In this section we investigate whether call workers detect
and correct mistakenly computed algorithmic scores. We
study both types of errors common to the phenomenon of
automation bias: omission errors and commission errors. That
is, we investigate whether call workers commit errors of
omission—screening out shown low-risk cases that are as-
sessed as high(er) risk— and errors of commission—screening
in shown high-risk cases that are assessed as lower risk. For
this analysis, we use the fact that the shown score did not
always correspond to the predicted score during the analyzed
post-deployment period. Therefore, in some cases the score
shown corresponded to an underestimation of risk, while in
others it corresponded to an overestimation.
(a) (b)
Figure 7: Analysis of human decisions. Fraction of screen-in’s for: (a) overestimation (S˜ > S), equality (S˜= S), underestimation
(S˜ < S) of the assessed score for binned shown scores; (b) binned shown score for cases in which the screen-in should have been
mandatory, M = 1. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
It is remarkable to note that the human decisions are better
calibrated with respect to the assessed score S than with respect
to the shown score S˜, as seen in Figure 6. The relatively high
screen-in rates for cases with very low shown scores suggest
that the call workers are effectively using information at their
disposal to avoid many errors of omission, and choosing to
screen in around 30% of cases that are shown to have the
lowest risk scores. Meanwhile, only a very small fraction
of cases with an assessed score in the lowest buckets were
screened in. This is consistent with what we observe at the
high risk end of the scales. Again, call workers seem to be
making use of available information to choose not to screen in
cases that the machine marks as high-risk, thereby avoiding
errors of commission. This result is particularly surprising
given that overriding many of these cases would require a
supervisor’s approval. When focusing on those that required
approval to be screened out, M˜ = 1, call workers screen in
66% of the cases. This rate goes down to 57% when only
considering those that should not have been in this bucket
(cases cases where M˜ = 1 and M = 0). This indicates that
humans are more likely to override a shown mandatory screen
in when it is not an assessed mandatory. It is not surprising
that screen in rates are high for shown mandatories overall,
as high shown scores correlated strongly with high assessed
scores.
In order to explore this behavior further, we look at decisions
for under- and over-estimated scores in Figure 7. Figure 7a
shows the percentage of screen-in’s for binned S˜. Correct
indicates that the assessed score is equal to the shown score,
underestimation means that the score shown was lower than
the assessed score, and overestimation means that the score
shown was higher than the assessed score. If the call work-
ers were to blindly follow the risk tool, we would observe
that within each score bucket the screen-in rates are the same
across all three classes. We observe something very different.
It is clearly evident from the analysis that, among cases with
similar shown scores, cases for which the score was underes-
timated are screened in at much higher rates than the others.
What this means is that humans are seemingly able to identify
that the risk is being underestimated for these cases. For exam-
ple, for the cases with a shown score between 11 and 15, those
for which this score was an underestimation of the assessed
score were screened in at a rate of almost 60%, while the other
cases with a shown score between 11 and 15 were screened
in at rates around 30%. This suggests that the call workers
make use of other pieces of information—either from the call
or from the administrative data system directly— and respond
appropriately by screening-in with higher probability. Some-
what surprisingly, we do not observe such a stark pattern for
overestimated cases except in the highest risk bucket, where
call workers are less likely to screen-in cases that should have
had lower scores assigned.
While Figure 7a allows us to observe certain patterns, it does
not differentiate between over and underestimations of differ-
ent magnitude. For that reason, we zoom-in on the decisions
made for assessed mandatories (M = 1). Figure 7b shows
the proportion of cases M = 1 that were screened in for each
bucket of shown score, S˜. This rate is approximately constant
across all buckets, suggesting that the underestimation of the
assessed score had no effect on the call workers’ actions and
they were able to make use of other information to identify
these high risk cases. Even when the shown placement score
was more than 12 points lower than the assessed placement
score, the screen-in was still as likely as for a shown mandatory
case.
The first part of our analysis established that workers did
update their behavior when the tool was deployed. Meanwhile,
the findings summarized in Figure 6 and Figure 7 indicate
Figure 8: Rate of screened-in cases accepted for service across
buckets of score shown, grouped according to the relationship
between the score shown and the assessed score.
that they do not follow the score blindly. Instead, workers
successfully make use of other sources of information and are
more likely to override the machine when the shown score is
significantly miscalculated.
What can we say about the quality of these decisions, beyond
their relationship with the assessed predicted risk? When a call
is screened in, a social worker visits the family and is tasked
with deciding whether to open a child welfare case, which is
termed as “accept for service". If call workers’ performance
had been perfect and there were no resource constraints, we
could expect all referrals they screen in to have an case opened.
Before deployment of the tool, 18% of investigated referrals
were accepted for services, 19% were connected to an existing
open case involving the family, and 63% were not accepted
for service. Post-deployment, these rates were 21%, 23%,
and 56%, respectively. This indicates a higher precision in
the post-deployment period: more of the screened-in referrals
were being provided with services.
Figure 8 shows the rates of cases accepted for service across
buckets of scores, grouped according to the relationship be-
tween the score shown and the assessed score–the same group-
ing used in Figure 7a. For example, for the cases with a shown
score between 11 and 15, more than half of those for which
this score was an underestimation of the assessed score were
accepted for services upon screen-in. Meanwhile, this statistic
drops to 15% for all other cases with a score shown in this
bucket. The similarity between Figure 8 and Figure 7a is strik-
ing. In Figure 7a we observed that humans are very good at
identifying cases that had an underestimated score, being more
likely to screen these in. In Figure 8 we observe that these
are indeed more likely to be accepted for service following an
investigation.
(a) (b)
Figure 9: Screen-in rates by race pre- and post-deployment.
(a) overall; (b) for subset of cases M = 1.
Disparities in decision-making
One of the main concerns surrounding the implementation of
risk assessment tools is that this may exacerbate disparities,
harming already marginalized groups. In the scenario of child
welfare, disparities across race and income level are of partic-
ular concern [16]. While it is important to ensure that children
are being protected, it is also important to avoid overburdening
a group with interventions that may have harmful unintended
consequences.
Figure 9 shows the screen-in rates for Black and White chil-
dren before and after the deployment of the tool. We observe
a slight reduction on screen-in rates for Blacks and a slight
increase for Whites. Prior work has identified differences in
overrides across groups as a source of disparities. We there-
fore also analyze if there is a difference in alignment with the
assessed mandatory screen-in policy across groups. Figure 9b
shows the screen-in rates for the subset of cases for which
M = 1. Here, we observe that screen-in rates for both races
increase, although the increase is slightly sharper for White
children. These results indicate that, unlike what has been
observed in other domains, there does not appear to be a dif-
ference in willingness to adhere to the recommendation that
would compound previous racial injustices.
We also consider disparities across socioeconomic factors. Be-
cause the features available for risk assessment rely in part
in previous interactions with the public services, one concern
that arises is whether differential reliance on the risk assess-
ment tool will disadvantage those who have sought out the
government’s support in the past. Moreover, and most relevant
to the focus of this work, it would be concerning if willing-
ness to override the machine’s prediction varied depending
on how wealthy the children’s family is. If this was the case,
we should observe that screen-in rates for cases labeled as
M = 1 decrease as the wealth increased. Figure 10 shows the
screen-in rates by poverty rates, defined as % of households
below the poverty level in the persons’ neighbourhood. Here,
we see that, among assessed mandatory cases, screen in rates
do not appear to correlate with neighbourhood poverty levels.
Figure 10: Screen-in rates by fraction of households below
the poverty level in the persons’ neighbourhood, pre- and
post-deployment, for subset of cases with predicted mandatory
screen-in, M = 1.
DISCUSSION
Our analysis studied the adoption of a risk assessment tool
that assists call workers tasked with deciding which calls con-
cerning potential child neglect or abuse should be screened
in for further investigation. We focused our analysis on in-
vestigating whether humans successfully override or ignore
erroneous algorithmic scores. We have found that call workers
did change their behavior when the tool was deployed, show-
ing partial adherence to the machine’s recommendation. We
also found that call workers were less likely to adhere to the
recommendations in cases where a technical glitch resulted in
an incorrect score being displayed.
When considering how humans make use of recommendations
provided by an algorithmic system, algorithm aversion and
automation bias can be seen as two ends of a broad spectrum,
both of which are undesirable. On one end, algorithm aver-
sion leads the human to completely disregard the machine,
even when the recommendation may be providing useful in-
formation that would improve the quality of decisions. On the
other end, automation bias results in humans blindly following
the machine’s recommendations, failing to make use of other
sources of information and their own judgement to disregard
the recommendation when evidence suggests that the machine
may be mistaken. The call workers in our study were found
to not be at either of these extremes. Call workers changed
their decision-making following the deployment of the tool,
but they did not adhere to the tool’s recommendations in every
instance.
A clear limitation of our study is that it is retrospective in
nature. However, this retrospective data also offers a rare op-
portunity to study a phenomenon that would not be ethically
feasible to investigate as a randomized field trial. By virtue of
being a study of a real deployed system, our study has the ad-
vantage of inherent field validity. While crowd worker studies
and randomized field experiments allow for controlled varia-
tion of different factors, even the best conceived randomized
trials can fail to have field validity in social policy settings [36].
Moreover, given the high-stakes nature of the task, behaviors
displayed by call workers when given hypothetical calls in a
lab setting may differ from their behavior when faced with a
real allegation of child abuse. Our investigation of the tech-
nical glitch demonstrates that certain phenomena are in fact
observed to occur when trained experts are making high-stakes
decisions in a real world setting.
What contributed to these positive results? The retrospective
nature of our study means that we were unable to perturb
different elements of the decision making framework in order
to assess their impact on decision outcomes. However, through
our analysis and discussions with jurisdiction staff, we are
able to identify certain elements of the deployment setup that
we believe likely influenced the observed behavior, which
we elaborate on below. An important direction for future
research is to further investigate these and other factors in
more controlled settings to gain a better understanding of their
influence on commission and omission errors in algorithm
assisted decision making.
A key contributing factor is that throughout the process call
workers continued to have access to not only the referral calls
but also the administrative data system. This provided a dif-
ferent view of the case than what was being pulled into the
risk score calculation. In particular, even when inputs related
to past child welfare history were being miscalculated in real
time, workers would still have access to the correct informa-
tion in the data system. In addition to the role of having access
to the raw features, and having the time to inspect these, it
is particularly important to highlight that call workers had
been previously trained to make decisions without the aid of
a risk assessment score. Therefore, they had experience in
parsing and interpreting the raw data. A question that arises is
whether this previous experience had an important role, and
whether the same behavior can be expected from call workers
who start working after the deployment of the tool. The an-
swer to this question could inform the need for training that
teaches experts how to make use of other sources of data ap-
propriately, in order to avoid an over-reliance on algorithmic
recommendations.
Secondly, the risk tool provides workers only with a score, and
does not ‘explain’ its predictions, nor does it display values
of any of the features involved in the score calculation. If this
additional information had been provided, it is possible that
the glitch would have been detected by workers. However, it
is also possible that this distillation of the data would have
been trusted by workers, who would in turn have been dis-
suaded from examining the original data. In the latter case, the
workers would likely have been more susceptible to omission
errors.
With regard to design recommendations, the results highlight
the fact that humans-in-the-loop can help guard against harm-
ful effects resulting from erroneous algorithmic recommenda-
tions. Evidence in other domains has shown that humans-in-
the-loop do not always improve the quality of decisions, lead-
ing some to call for complete automation of tasks. However,
providing humans with autonomy to contradict the machine
mitigated the effects of miscalculated scores in the child mal-
treatment call screening context. Given that technical glitches
as the one studied in this paper are always a risk, and that any
statistical model will make mistakes, design should focus on
augmenting the human’s ability to identify and correct mis-
takes. Future research in controlled settings that evaluates the
effect of individual elements of the decision-making pipeline
described in this paper could identify specific design practices
that effectively strengthen the human’s role.
More research is also needed to understand how to develop
machine learning decision support tools that provide informa-
tion helpful to the humans in assessing whether the machine’s
predictions effectively account for all factors relevant to a case.
This is an especially challenging task in forecasting settings
where research shows that human predictions tend to under-
perform those of statistical models. Whereas humans (or a
consensus of humans) may be expected to identify cases where
an image classifier incorrectly tags a dog as a cat, humans are
not as reliable in assessing which students will succeed, which
children are at risk, or which defendants will appear for court.
We hope that the findings presented in this paper will moti-
vate further work on developing systems that make it easier
for humans to assess whether the machine may be making
a mistake in the forecasting setting. In particular, many of
the decision-pipeline elements likely contributed to workers
selectively trusting the machine by questioning its recommen-
dations. Further research is needed to better understand the
role that trust and other factors play in the overall success of
human-in-the-loop algorithmic systems.
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